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3 June 1952

Chief, SR
 Chief, EE
 Chief of Station, Frankfurt

REDSOX/AESAURUS/Operational

Transmittal of Revised CACCOLA 1 Protocol

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of the revised protocol covering all aspects of CACCOLA 1. Most of it has been concurred in by CAPABLE 7 who retains a copy of a sterilized version. Additional copies of this version are being forwarded to Headquarters under MGMA-09833. This revised protocol supersedes any others that may have been drawn up in the past either here or at Headquarters with CAPABLE 1 regarding internal USSR operations. [] will still be required to get CAPABLE 7's approval of Part II. No difficulties are foreseen, but if slight revisions are made, they will be cabled back keyed to the proper paragraph.

2. Before attempting a critical analysis of this protocol, we feel we should explain the three basic assumptions which underlined our negotiations of the document with CAPABLE 7. First, our experience in dealing with CAPABLE 1 in the first CACCOLA 1 cycle was, on the whole, favorable in that it proved to us that we could get along with CAPABLE 1 personnel in an acceptable manner. Second, we do not know of another organization which is capable of providing candidates for operations inside the USSR, who are motivated to the extent that they are willing to enter the country and remain there indefinitely in the interests of the struggle against the common enemy. Even the CASINO agents, who as independently recruited agents, were remarkable for their morale, do not entirely buy the idea of long term residence in an operational capacity inside the target area. Third, CAPABLE 1 has shown itself willing to accept our conditions of security, operational and administrative control procedures, etc., but under no circumstances will it accept the position of merely the "supplier of bodies". It feels that it must be a part of the operation even though that participation may be restricted by us to a degree that is sometimes irritating to them. We must remember that the person who seeks assistance can seldom avoid showing some resentment of the fact that he is forced to seek that assistance. Therefore, we have tried to word the protocol in a manner which is not offensive yet retains those principles we believe essential.

3. In the following paragraphs we present specific comments on the protocol each keyed to the pertinent paragraph of the document. We do this for two reasons. First, we may desire to point out that actual practice will differ from the procedure stated in the protocol. If this is the case, the comment contained herein is to be accepted as the actual way in which we will proceed.

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Second, in some cases it may be necessary to offer an explanation for why we included certain items or phrased them in a given manner.

a. Para 1, Part I. It is anticipated that the assessment of the present group of candidates for the second cycle will be completed sometime in early July. We will then be capable of giving the trainees who will have been accepted basic W/T and physical hardening training here but urge that the transfer to the U.S. take place by September.

b. Para 2, Part I. In the case of the past cycle, we recommended the mission areas and they were accepted. In fact, we carried the ball all along the line, and our ideas were in most cases gratefully received. No problems were encountered in training site selection, timetables, etc. We did have a disagreement on the amount of time needed for propaganda, but later, when the CAPABLE 1 instructors saw how little time there always seems to be and how much else is necessary, they agreed to minimize this aspect.

c. Para 3, Part I. No comment.

d. Para 4, Part I. This catch-all paragraph puts the control of these matters in our hands, but we in turn call on the senior CAPABLE 1 man to see to it that all administrative, security, etc., directives are carried out by the trainees.

e. Para 5, Part I. The real intent of this paragraph is to insure that the dispatch procedure, whether it be by aircraft, submarine or balloon, remains entirely a DYGLAIM show. We did not permit the CAPABLE 1 instructors to go to the last staging area near the dispatch air base when we dispatched the last cycle because to have done so would have given them access to information and personalities about which they had no "need to know". We feel this is important because these dispatch facilities are used by operations other than CAPABLE 1 and knowledge of them should be restricted.

f. Para 6, Part I. There is no way of avoiding this. We can merely state that in the past when we presented problems to CAPABLE 7 in an orderly manner with specific reasons for our action, he would agree without question. His comments were always helpful and to the point. Naturally, it will be more difficult having him 3,000 miles away, but this can be overcome by insuring that communications to him from his man in CACCOLA 1 and our senior case officer are clear and precise and reflect complete agreement.

g. Para 7, Part I. In this manner we hope to avoid the problems which beset the AEBONUS operation. CAPABLE 7 realizes that we cannot accept a situation whereby he will have to approve every action taken by his representative even though it may be a minor matter.

h. Para 8, Part I. This is the "sugar" that CAPABLE 7 desires to flavor the protocol. Both he and we realize that he will probably not be able to make three visits per year to the school since he is so tied up with other CAPABLE 1 operational work. In the time CACCOLA 1's first cycle was in training, he visited that school only four times even though it is in the same country. However, he wants to have the privilege whether he can take advantage of it or not.

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i. Para 9, Part I. No comment.

j. Para 10, Part I. This refers to the overt structure and membership both in Europe and the United States. It also will avoid a situation wherein the overt CAPABLE 1 representative in the United States would get into the act as was the case frequently with CAPABLE 5.

k. Para 11, Part I. The assessment will be handled by the CSOB Assessment and Recruiting Section after the CACCOLA 1 School moves to the U.S. Naturally, for CACCOLA 1 we will continue to draw on personnel recruited in other areas as well as in the U.S.

l. Para 1, Part II. Briefly, Plan "KARKAS" divides the agent's activity into three phases: first, legalization; second, procurement and transmittal of operational intelligence; third, initiation of various stages and levels of "revolutionary" activity. No agent is permitted to pass from one phase to the next without base approval. Both CAPABLE 1 and ourselves agree on the priority importance of operational data. Hence, even if the agent were able and willing to engage in overt "pamphlet pushing" in a USSR city (knowing what little we do about conditions inside, we feel it will be a long time before any agent will seriously suggest he get involved in this), we would both hesitate to have him risk it since this source of operational intelligence would then be lost. It is important to note that CAPABLE 7 will consider the acceptance of "special assignments" (collection of military or economic intelligence) from DYCLAIM only after phases one and two have been completed successfully. It is our belief that REDSOX concurs in this approach.

m. Para 2, Part II. It may appear here that we are conceding joint control of internal operations when we all recognize that this sort of control is always less efficient and secure than unilateral U.S. control. However, just as we would like to see these operations become strictly DYCLAIM property once the agents are inside, there has also been a tendency, albeit now corrected, for CAPABLE 1 to feel that as soon as the training and dispatch in "their" struggle against the regime. This paragraph makes it very clear that DYCLAIM has a stake in the internal aspects of the operations which is every bit as important as that of CAPABLE 1 even though the agents concerned are CAPABLE 1 members.

n. Paragraph 3, Part II. No comment. Accepted by CAPABLE 1 as basic doctrine.

o. Para 4, Part II. This paragraph framed this way because (1) we did not want CAPABLE 7 under the impression he would be consulted every time an exchange of messages took place; (2) we would want to consult the CAPABLE 1 instructors who also knew the agents, sometimes better than our own case officers did, in formulating replies, analyzing certain aspects of the traffic, etc.; and (3) it satisfies CAPABLE 7 that CAPABLE 1 interests are being protected.

p. Para 5, Part II. In order to appreciate the reasoning behind this paragraph it is necessary to know exactly how we intend to handle the traffic: Upon receipt of the number text, the DYCLAIM case officer will convert and translate the message, after which it will be forwarded to Headquarters. When the CACCOLA 1 School moves to the U.S., day-to-day control of the traffic will center at Headquarters. Then the case officer will decide what parts of the message he feels should be shown to the CAPABLE 1 senior instructor at CACCOLA 1. Generally, it will probably be most of the message. We feel it

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would be extremely unwise to conceal the fact that messages are received because (1) the agent may exfiltrate, and (2) there is always the possibility that the agent has made an agreement with the CAPABLE 1 instructor to include a phrase in his first message, and to have a similar phrase sent in reply by the instructor. We do not feel that any attempt will be made to set up a regular continuing indicator or special code system because CACCOLA 8, the W/T instructor knows how easily this could foul up the entire safety and danger signals pattern. Once the paraphrased message has been shown the CAPABLE 1 instructor and his ideas on a suitable reply solicited if needed, the copy of the paraphrased message is placed back in a DYCLAIM safe in a file containing those paraphrased messages shown to CAPABLE 1. Under no circumstances will they be given copies of even the paraphrase.

q. Para 6, Part II. These reports to CAPABLE 7 will refer to the traffic in only the most general terms and will of course go via DYCLAIM channels.

r. Para 7, Part II. The need for this is self evident, but in the past CAPABLE 7 has delayed action to a point where traces could not be run in time. He is slowly accepting the concept and we should not be troubled in the future.

4. We feel this is the best protocol we can negotiate under the circumstances, but we are also convinced that if patience and good will are demonstrated, it will produce the desired results.

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PROTOCOL

PART I - Establishment of a CACCOLA 1 School

1. The CACCOLA 1 School is for the training of CAPABLE 1 members for penetration operations in all parts of the USSR. The school will be moved to the U.S. as soon as deemed advisable by DYCLAIM.

2. The staff of the CACCOLA 1 School will consist of CAPABLE 1 and DYCLAIM instructors who will decide jointly:

a. the missions of the CAPABLE 1 trainees;

b. the training program, with the exception of W/T training the direction of which will be the sole responsibility of DYCLAIM.

3. The housekeeping staff for the school will be furnished by CAPABLE 1.

4. DYCLAIM is solely responsible for the security, finances and administration of the school, including the choice of all training sites.

5. DYCLAIM is solely responsible for the dispatch of CAPABLE 1 trainees and for all technical training connected with the dispatch.

6. CAPABLE 7, as the senior CAPABLE 1 operations officer, must approve the nature and place of missions to be assigned to CAPABLE 1 trainees after they have been worked out by the CAPABLE 1 and DYCLAIM staffs attached to the school.

7. CAPABLE 7 will appoint the senior CAPABLE 1 instructor for the school, who will be empowered to deal directly with DYCLAIM officers assigned to the school on all matters pertaining to (a) the training of CAPABLE 1 trainees, and (b) the implementation of their missions.

8. CAPABLE 7 will be kept informed of the progress of the trainees and also afforded an opportunity to visit the school not less than three times a year.

9. All operational correspondence between CAPABLE 7 and the senior CAPABLE 1 instructor at the school will go through the channels of DYCLAIM.

10. The CACCOLA 1 School will be kept completely separate from the overt CAPABLE 1 structure, knowledge of its existence will not be made known to CAPABLE 1 members, and the senior CAPABLE 1 instructor at the school will be directly subordinate to CAPABLE 7.

11. All CAPABLE 1 recruiting in the U.S. will be done for the CAPABLE 1 Cadre School. No CAPABLE 1 member may become a candidate for the CACCOLA 1 School until he has completed the Cadre School. Prior to assignment to the CACCOLA 1 School, DYCLAIM must assess and approve the candidate.

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PART II - Direction of Operations Within the USSR

1. The direction of operational activities of CAPABLE 1 personnel in the USSR will be guided by the principles laid down in Plan "KARKAS".
2. The direction of these activities will be the joint responsibility of CAPABLE 1 and DYCLAIM.
3. The maintenance and security of W/T communications with CAPABLE 1 personnel in the USSR is the sole responsibility of DYCLAIM.
4. The day-to-day handling of W/T traffic will be carried out by the senior CAPABLE 1 instructor and the senior DYCLAIM instructor attached to the CACCOLA 1 School.
5. All logs, messages, copies, etc., pertaining to the W/T traffic will be held by DYCLAIM for reasons of security. This material will be made available to the responsible CAPABLE 1 officer for his inspection upon request.
6. CAPABLE 7 will be kept informed of the progress of the operation by the senior CAPABLE 1 instructor at the CACCOLA 1 School.
7. In the event that CAPABLE 1 members who will operate in the USSR are to be provided with either contacts inside or addresses abroad to be used in letter S/W correspondence, DYCLAIM must be informed in sufficient time to run security checks on these individuals.

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